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Abstract 
This paper argues on European Defence issues, namely, the challenges after the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The first part analyses, in an historical perspective, the evolution of European defence, from its origins 
to the implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy, assessing its decade of existence. 
The second part focuses on the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon and the future 
challenges faced by the Common Security and Defence Policy at institutional, conceptual and 
capabilities levels. 
The third part considers European defence and the transatlantic relationship, in particular the 
articulation between CSDP and NATO. 
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Introduction 
The Treaty of Lisbon stands unarguably as a paramount step in the making of the European 
integration. As of December 1
st
 2009, the European Union is equipped with a set of institutional tools 
allowing a better response to its challenges, both at the domestic and international level; at the 
domestic level, in dealing with institutional structure change in order to adapt and ensure efficiency in 
an enlarged Europe of 27, as well as at the international level, with reinforced external action 
mechanisms allowing for more consistency and coherence in answering the challenges in an 
increasingly globalized world. 
The Treaty of Lisbon has made a reality out of institutional tools. It remains to be seen if the EU 
will be able to politically translate these tools into a deepening European integration process. 
Generally, one can argue that these tools are expected to translate into considerable advance in three 
main areas: firstly, by rationalizing the institutional structure endowing it with a faster and more 
efficient decision-making process. Secondly, by increasing transparency and democratic legitimacy 
and empowering citizens and its representatives. Thirdly, by strengthening the EU external action 
mechanisms, namely, in security and defence. 
1. One decade of European Security and Defence Policy 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has now gone over its first decade, initially propelled 
into action by the Saint Malo French-British bilateral summit, in 1998, subsequently enforced at the 
multilateral level by the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki, the then 15 member States of the 
European Union (EU) decided to take on the taboo of the military dimension of European integration – 
a topic that had been left on the side ever since the failure of the European Defence Community in 
1953 – and to establish the conditions for the EU to “play its full role on the international stage ... 
[and] to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities 
regarding a common European policy on security and defence.”1 This intention was formally 
consecrated in the Nice Treaty in 2000, a historical step in the process of European integration.  
The ESDP has been since one of the most dynamic areas of European integration, regardless of the 
advances and retreats with the various treaties of the Union.  
The European integration was built on the basis of two key methods. On the one hand, through the 
dominant process over the last few years, namely with the preparation of the Constitutional Treaty of 
the European Union, which encapsulates the attempt to find a broad political vision and corresponding 
institutional architecture for the EU (by definition, always imperfect and incomplete). On the other 
hand, the method which prevailed from Robert Schuman´s European project inauguration in 1950, 
seeking to unite the ‘European ideal’ with a demonstrable European capacity to solve the day-to-day 
problems of its citizens.  
One cannot deny the evidence of past experience – namely the failure of the European Defence 
Community at the start of the process of European integration, and of the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005 – which tells us that attempts to leave behind old phases, and to initiate new ones, can cause 
serious back-tracking not always easy to recover from. By sheer contrast, the path of taking ‘small 
steps’ may turn into a more labour intensive process and require greater resilience, but it has also 
proved to be successful. ESDP clearly illustrates the success of the latter. 
                                                     
1
 Appendix III – Declaration of the European Council on the Reinforcement of the Common European Security and 
Defense Policy, Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council of Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, available at: 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/pt/ec/kolnpt.htm  
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Based on the shared principles and values at the heart of the Union – democracy, respect for basic 
rights and freedoms – ESDP has evolved since 1999 through prudent and concrete steps in the 
institutional, operational and doctrinal domains, going beyond the body of the treaty.  
The EU is now equipped with the institutional structure enabling it to respond to decisions with 
military implications. At the Helsinki European Council, in December 1999, member States agreed to 
establish the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, and the EU Chief of Staff, 
thus creating the necessary frame and decision-making mechanisms to address military matters.  
In terms of capabilities, the Headline Goal 2010 was approved in 2004,
2
 following a methodology 
similar to that established in Helsinki – albeit with renewed goals. This guiding document provided for 
the creation of European Rapid Response capabilities to engage in military peace-keeping and peace-
enforcement missions and to help manage crises. It gave way to the mandate to form Battle Groups, 
declared fully operational in January 2007. This was followed by the publication of the Progress 
Catalogue during the second half of 2007, under the Portuguese presidency of the Council of the EU. 
This document listed the state of Europe’s military capabilities, identifying the main priorities and 
strategic gaps, with an operational impact to be addressed before 2010. Three areas stand out in 
particular: military force protection; ability to deploy military forces (strategic transport in particular); 
and intelligence (in order to acquire information superiority).  
At the operation level, the EU has been carrying out missions on the ground uninterruptedly, in 
coordination with NATO, within the framework of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements, or autonomously. In 
order to respond to demands for regional security and stability, the EU has promoted more than two 
dozen ESDP missions–with a current total of 13 missions underway - 9 civilian, 3 military, 1 Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) - deploying around 7,000 men and women on the ground.  
In just a few years, the EU proved capable to respond promptly to crisis situations – as shown in 
Georgia in the summer of 2008 – as well as to set up missions in specific locations in timely fashion - 
as seen in the EUFORCHADE mission, a bridging operation with UN forces on the ground.  
Lastly, in doctrine terms, the European Security Strategy document presented in 2003
3
 identified 
the main threats to common security. A ground-breaking document in the history of European 
integration, it defined a joint strategic vision guiding European external actions. In December 2008, 
five years after its approval, the Council and High Representative for Foreign Policy Secretary-
General, Javier Solana, presented a document to the European Council assessing the implementation 
of the Strategy,
4
 in light of the current international context and the new challenges facing the Union, 
putting forward new policies to render European foreign policy more effective and to ensure it delivers 
by living up to EU goals and ambitions for the coming decade.  
Considering ESDP achievements so far, opposing views originate from the historical cleavage 
between two different continental and Atlantic strategic visions of European security: those who stand 
for the ‘European army’ model believe it far from achieving its goals; those who argue European 
security is about the defence of the Atlantic necessarily think it has gone much too far. In truth, this 
dichotomy no longer makes sense. If one is to face today and tomorrow´s threats and dangers, one 
                                                     
2
 Headline Goal 2010 was approved by the General Affairs and Foreign Relations Council on 17 May 2004, and signed by 
the European Council on 17-18 June of that year. The document is available at: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20 Goal.pdf. 
3
 The European security strategy document, A Safer Europe in a Better World, was approved by the European Council on 
12 December 2003. The document is available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/031208ESSIIP.pdf. 
4
 The European Council of December 2007 invited the Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for 
Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, to analyze the implementation of the Strategy together with the Commission and the 
member States, and to propose new elements for the Strategy to be better executed., The final report presented to the 
Council of the EU is available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17104.en08.pdf.  
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must set aside the prejudices of the past and address both European and trans-Atlantic security and 
defence needs. 
2. Challenges of the Common Security and Defence Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon 
In order to ensure that ‘European Defence’ can deal with the coming decade´s strategic and security 
challenges, it is important for the EU to first ascertain how ambitious its security and defence policy 
should be, as defined in the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on December 13
th
, 2007, by the 27 EU member 
States; secondly, it should be established which institutional, operational and conceptual adaptations 
are necessary to turn aims into reality. One should consider the Treaty of Lisbon as paramount to 
achieve both goals. 
As the Nice Treaty did for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) , the Treaty of Lisbon 
encompasses the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) within the framework of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), benefitting from the achievement of an EU external action, 
namely in legal, institutional and decision-making processes. The latter clearly translate into security 
and defence aspects; firstly, by recognizing the EU´s international legal personality; secondly, by 
supporting an external representation with the designation of a full-time President of The Council as 
well as a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. A dual-hatted position as 
Secretary-General of the Council, as well as vice-president of the Commission, will improve the 
Council/Commission articulation, allowing for a better coordination of external action tools, shared 
between the first and the second pillar, namely development aid and military instrument. Thirdly, by 
adopting the suited mechanisms to facilitate the decision-making process, namely, broadening the 
range of matters subject to vote by a qualified majority, with the exception of issues bearing military 
implications. 
Beyond its general alterations, the Treaty of Lisbon embodies a series of specific changes in 
matters of security and defence, breaking new ground in four designated areas. Firstly, by innovating 
its semantic nature with a profound political significance, that is, changing its formal designation from 
ESDP to CSDP, the formal assumption embodied in the Treaty that Member States share common 
security and defence interests, which they need to further develop together. 
Secondly, by introducing two key solidarity clauses concerning security and defence matters: a 
mutual defence clause (Article 42, nº 7), according to which “If a Member State is the victim of armed 
aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and 
assistance by all the means in their power”; and a solidarity clause (Article 222), which comes into 
play when natural or man-made disasters or terrorist attacks occur. According to these clauses, 
member States commit themselves to mutually assisting their peers in specific situations, thus 
promoting the EU founding principle of solidarity among Member States.  
Thirdly, the Treaty of Lisbon broadens the scope of missions – originally known as the Petersburg 
Missions – in which the EU can use civilian and military means (Article 43), having, for the first time, 
specified the kinds of missions fit to this category.
5
 
Fourth and finally, two important mechanisms for security and defence cooperation have been 
introduced to the Treaty of Lisbon: the ‘reinforced cooperation’ mechanism,6 and the permanent 
                                                     
5
 This includes joint disarmament actions, humanitarian and evacuation missions, military advisory and assistance 
missions, conflict-prevention and peace-keeping missions, missions by combat forces to manage crises, including 
missions to re-establish peace and stabilization missions at the end of conflicts.  
6
 See Title IV of the Treaty on the working of the European Union. 
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structured cooperation mechanism.
7
 Concerning reinforced cooperation, this mechanism was 
established by the Amsterdam and Nice treaties, now covering foreign and common security policy in 
situations where the Union, as a whole, cannot achieve the cooperation goals within a reasonable time 
frame, and whenever at least 9 member states participate in the designated action. The permanent 
structured cooperation mechanism, by contrast, provides for closer cooperation between Member 
States able to show capacity and willingness to make greater efforts in the security domain. The goal 
of this mechanism is clear: to promote the establishment of an effective political framework and 
instrument to develop European military capabilities, according to criteria agreed to by the member 
States. More specifically, the goal is to encourage states to channel the resources already spent on 
defence to focus on collective interests, particularly when it comes to the deployment and maintenance 
of military forces and the promotion of defence research and development (R&D).  
The development of this cooperation mechanism can be seen from two different angles. Critics 
consider that it merely creates the opportunity for main European powers to deepen cooperation, 
sidelining all other Member States, whereas others feel this may promote the development of the 
defence capabilities of all Member States, large and small alike, willing to contribute to common 
defence and security goal, namely by enabling them to participate in international military missions. 
EU Member States must thus choose which interpretation they find most persuasive.  
The essential goal of these newly created instruments is to give the EU a broad and coherent vision, 
allowing it to become a global player with a decisive role to play in the promotion of a safer and more 
stable world. For this to happen, it is vital to consider European defence as a priority. It is necessary to 
strengthen the ESDP. 
In order to achieve it, taking into account the challenges faced by the EU in the international arena, 
it is crucial to promote a series of changes in the institutional, conceptual and operational (in terms of 
capabilities) domains.  
Firstly, in the institutional domain, in addition to defining ‘threats’ (already outlined in the 
European Security Strategy document), one must examine how these threats relate to one another, and 
how the Union can address them effectively. Clearly, it is important to promote coordinated inter-
pillar action, so that the strategy is mirrored in the policies and mechanisms adopted to promote global 
and integrated action. Although complementary, Security and Development domains are divided 
between two pillars of European integration: the Community pillar, which is managed by the 
Commission; and the Foreign Security Policy and CFSP pillar, under the aegis of the Council and the 
Member States. Emphasis should thus be placed on EU internal coordination: both coordination 
among those institutions with security and developmental competences (the Council and the 
Commission), and between Member State national policies.  
Furthermore, it is crucial to ensure the support, as a whole, of the general public, political parties 
and civil society for ESDP goals, but also to improve democratic control of the military instruments at 
the disposal of the EU. This is one of the functions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western 
European Union. After the approval of the Treaty of Lisbon and notwithstanding the competences of 
the European Parliament, this will also be a reinforced responsibility of national parliaments. The 
European public needs to be made aware of the importance of security and defence issues, not just at 
the international level but also for the process of European integration itself.  
Secondly, a conceptual change is needed: more specifically, the European Security Strategy needs 
to be updated. The Union must recognize and face new challenges and risks and keep in mind not just 
the prevailing international context but also the need to affirm the EU as a global player, willing to 
share the burden of international security responsibilities. As far as challenges are concerned, the EU 
                                                     
7
 Articles 42 and 46 of the TEU, and the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation established by article 42 of the 
TEU. 
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cannot afford to ignore the importance of EU-Russia relations, as well as with new emerging powers 
such as India, China and Brazil; it must also address issues related with globalization and the 
increasing rapidity of flows, be they financial, informational or other. Concerning risks, in addition to 
those already identified by the Security Strategy, concepts like energy security, maritime, food, and 
internet security should be considered, as well as the dangers posed by climate change, including 
natural disasters and pandemics.  
It is also necessary to define the rules of engagement for military operations, namely in high-level 
risk environments. We cannot pretend the international system is free of uncertainty, or ignore 
growing calls for EU civilian and/or military intervention; and we must also consider that intervention 
scenarios may increase with the Treaty of Lisbon mutual defence and solidarity clauses among 
member States. 
Furthermore, the EU must take on increasing security and defence duties not just within its own 
European territory borders, but also promote stability within its “near neighbourhood’, particularly in 
Africa and the Mediterranean. This is the reason why the EU cannot depend exclusively on the 
military capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance, which would anyway constitute a negation of its own 
defence responsibilities. We should state things clearly in this regard: the goal is not to establish 
rivalry with the Atlantic Alliance but, on the contrary, to ensure that capabilities are complementary 
and autonomous, so that Europe becomes a useful and credible ally in the task of bringing peace and 
stability to the international system.  
Thirdly, capabilities must be changed. To speak about ‘Defence Europe’ is to speak about the 
development of autonomous, credible and adapted military capabilities, which take the new 
international strategic environment into account.  
Given the challenges the EU faces, it will be necessary to deepen Europe’s rapid response 
capabilities to address crisis situations in three major ways: forming land, air and naval Battle Groups; 
reinforcing the capacity for autonomous planning and operations; and creating a European Defence 
technological and industrial base. To that end, an inter-governmental mechanism is needed to promote 
the harmonization of military needs, establishing economies of scale which may sustain a shared 
defence industry among EU Member States. This should be the central role of the European Defence 
Agency (EDA).  
Concerning the development of European capabilities, three broad guidelines should be followed: 
firstly, developing capabilities that include European rapid response mechanisms; secondly, 
developing capabilities allowing more demanding operations; and thirdly, promoting projects within 
the framework of the EDA. The ultimate goal of this effort, one that should be shared by all the 
member States, is the creation of a competitive and efficient European defence market.  
Finally, concerning the operational dimension, the EU has played an increasing role in conflict-
prevention, conflict-management and conflict-resolution missions, particularly on the African 
continent. These missions have a civilian as well as a military component, involving various state 
institutions (military and police forces, justice system), and instruments (development aid). In other 
words, the goal is to promote integrated security, state-building and development capacities. This can 
take place at two levels: firstly, by promoting shared and ‘integrated’ knowledge about security and by 
working jointly on development issues; and secondly, by establishing multi-disciplinary teams – 
including representatives from defence, foreign, development, justice and home affairs, among others 
– to promote the adoption of integrated strategies to frame the external action of the European Union.  
On the other hand, we must try to improve the operational results of European military forces. 
More specifically, it is essential to increase the percentage of deployable vis-à-vis effective forces, and 
to develop the capacity to sustain them abroad, establishing smaller more expeditionary groups based 
on combined or joint forces. This is the path followed by various European countries in the 
modernization process of their Armed Forces.  
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Finally, we must rethink and adapt ESDP financing mechanisms to suit the needs generated by 
international crises, particularly those requiring a rapid response. Member States must take on the 
civilian and military costs of ESDP missions just as they have accepted the duties associated with the 
creation of international security conditions. On the other hand, it is also important to consider 
innovative financing formulas, both at the national and community level, which may facilitate the 
availability and use of military forces within the framework of the EU.  
3. European Defence and Trans-Atlantic Relationship 
The Atlantic Alliance and the EU are two fundamental pillars of multilateral security and defence. 
Insofar as this is the case, any ESDP developments will be coordinated with, and complement, the 
central role NATO plays in Western European defence. We must find the institutional means to 
permanently articulate respective priorities, coordinate missions, and maximize security and defence 
capacities and means. The goal is not to create a rivalry between the two, but rather to establish a 
useful and credible alliance between both.  
European defence should not rival the international security system or NATO; it should, without a 
shadow of doubt, play a complementary role. This is the spirit of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements, which 
are the foundation of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, and should be the spirit 
guiding the member States and the Atlantic Alliance.  
The strategic framework for the relations between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union 
must be clearly defined and reinforced in the areas of security, defence and crisis management. It is 
true that there is already concrete cooperation between the two institutions, but what is most needed is 
a shared strategic vision, without which defence and security complementarities between the Atlantic 
Alliance and the European Union cannot evolve stably and permanently. This must be the goal to 
achieve in the context of the transatlantic relationship, to fully restore trust between the two pillars of 
the Alliance: the European and the North American. The time to do this is now. Today, the United 
States acknowledge the need for a strong and cohesive Europe and for the reinforcement of 
autonomous European defence capabilities with a framework that allows the EU and the Atlantic 
Alliance to share responsibility for the collective defence of European citizens. It is also necessary for 
EU Member States to confirm their determination to reject strategies that stand in the way of, rather 
than consolidate, the internal cohesion of the Union as well as the cohesion of the transatlantic 
relationship.  
This commitment is paramount so the Atlantic Alliance can address its growing international 
security duties, and the European Union can take on its European defence and near neighbourhood 
security responsibilities.  
It should be noted, in the light of recent events, that NATO´s new strategic concept outlines 
strategic partnerships as a priority. For as much as these partnerships may be occasional or 
international context-led, the EU remains solely the true permanent structural strategic partnership at 
the core of the transatlantic security community.  
On that note, the EU must accept its responsibilities if Europe is to have a future as an international 
player. Europe should aim at remaining an economic power, as well as a civil power, but it must also 
have a military dimension. Thirty years ago, the idea that the European Community might become an 
international player was nothing short of an Utopia. Today, it has become a stepping stone for 
European security and global stability. The goal of making the EU a global player with broad 
capabilities should guide the effort to consolidate Europe’s Security and Defence Policy. 
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